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Briefing Note  
 
 
An Arctic Boom of Policies & Strategies:  
32 and Counting  
 
Lassi Heininen  
 
 
Traditions are neither mandatory per se, nor do they commit you. However they easily remind and 
engage you about something to be interested in and follow. As the theme of the first Arctic 
Yearbook, in 2012, was “Arctic Policies and Strategies” – including a summary of the existing 
policies of the Arctic states, the first articles on interests and emerging policies of the Asian and 
European non-Arctic states (China, France, Japan, Poland, Scotland, Singapore, UK), as well as 
Inuit engagement in regional Arctic politics – the Yearbook has since then followed the theme 
(e.g. Lackenbauer 2013 on India; Olsen & Shadian 2016 on Greenland; Rahbek-Clemmensen 2016 
on Denmark; Lim 2018 on China; Basse 2019 on Germany, and several analyses on the EU).  
Indeed, there has been, and continues to be, a clear tendency and progressive process, almost like 
a race, to update existing policies by the Arctic states – as Canada, Russia and Sweden recently did, 
and as Finland is in progress – and by the first non-Arctic states – as Germany did – to 
adopt/approve, or aim to release, the first Arctic policy by non-Arctic states – as Scotland recently 
did, and a few others are in process and progress. For example, as the newest Observer State of 
the Arctic Council Switzerland, representing a ‘vertical Arctic’ due to its high altitudes, is working 
on a Swiss Polar White Paper aiming to acknowledge the activities and initiatives of Swiss research 
institutes in the Arctic (Arctic Council, 2020) and introduce the country’s long and extensive 
experiences in polar and glaciological research. There is also discussion and proposals for Poland’s 
engagement in the Arctic, due to a “long-established tradition of Polish research in the area” (in 
Svalbard), and to adopt Arctic policy, as well as recommendations for the formulation and 
substance of such policy (e.g. Łuszczuk et al., 2015). As well as, there is a devoted article to the 
Indian Arctic policy (Pronina et al., 2020), though India has not, yet, adopted an official Arctic 
policy. Finally, the first comprehensive, systematic analysis of existing policy documents of the 
Arctic and non-Arctic states, Indigenous peoples’ organizations and the Arctic Council was 
released in early 2020 (Heininen et al., 2019).  
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Following from this tendency, there are, again, good reasons for the Arctic Yearbook to write 
about the theme. This briefing note first, presents an overview/summary of the comprehensive 
analysis, and second briefly describes the recently updated and new policies and discusses them in 
the context of the analysis. 
Before that as a personal observation I have a strange feeling (some others might have experienced 
the same) that though having broad research interests in IR, studies on Arctic policies was not my 
choice, but more the topic chose me. As a young researcher at the TAPRI international research 
project (on alternative development and security) my task was to focus on national approaches 
and interests of the smaller Arctic states (Canada, Denmark including Greenland, Finland, Iceland, 
Norway, Sweden), when senior researchers concentrated on the great powers (Soviet Union, USA). 
As an outcome, there was one of the first articles (Heininen, 1992) on national interests and 
agendas, but no explicit policies yet, of these Arctic states. This was updated and expanded to 
include the Russian Federation and the USA for the Barents Region’s international conference 
where the Finnish initiative for the European Union’s Northern Dimension was launched 
(Heininen, 1997). The next phase was the first comparative study and analysis of the 
policies/strategies of the eight Arctic states (after Sweden had approved its national Arctic strategy 
in May 2011) and that of the EU (Heininen, 2011) to be used as a handbook for policy-
shaping/making. It was followed by a developed version (Bailes & Heininen 2012), a detailed 
inventory of the Arctic states’ policies (with Hanna Lempinen) ordered by the Swedish foreign 
ministry as background material (not published) for the Kiruna Vision (2013) at Sweden’s Arctic 
Council chairmanship, and the above-mentioned summary for Arctic Yearbook 2012. As if this 
would not be enough, I was also leading the 2019 comprehensive study at IIASA. 
Comprehensive study and analysis on Arctic policies 
In spite of these articles and publications on intergovernmental cooperation, governance and 
institutions, geopolitics and Arctic policies, and the resource potential1, there were only a couple 
of studies/overviews on the priorities of the Arctic states’ national interests in addition of the 
classic book, The Circumpolar North by Armstrong et al. (1978) in the late 1970s. Among others, the 
article by Brosnan et al. (2011) on (how cooperation and conflict appear in) the Arctic strategies 
of the five Arctic Ocean littoral states, and the articles of Arctic Yearbook 2012 on the Arctic 
Council Observer states (e.g. Plouffe, 2012 on France; Alexeeva & Lasserre, 2012 on China; 
Tonami & Watters, 2012  on  Japan; Depledge, 2012 on UK). There was no in-depth analysis on 
the national policies of the Arctic Council Observer States (as non-Arctic countries), policies of 
Arctic Indigenous peoples’ organizations (as Arctic Council Permanent Participants), or the 
Council’s Ministerial meeting declarations.  
These gaps in research related to Arctic governance and politics, as well as a lack of comprehensive 
study and analysis of all state and non-state policies, and Arctic Council declarations, were seen as 
an opportunity for the Arctic Futures Initiative (AFI). As a new-generation research project at the 
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA), the aim was to provide a holistic and 
systematic analysis of policies and practices, and deliver decision support with options that balance 
environmental protection, economic prosperity and societal well-being for the rapidly changing 
Arctic. However, the AFI was terminated by the IIASA Directorate in summer 2019, and therefore 
only its flagship project, Arctic Policies & Strategies – Analysis, Synthesis and Trends (by Heininen, 
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Everett, Padrtova and Reissell) was managed to be completed.2 It is a comparative, deep, 
systematic study and analysis of existing policies and priorities of the Arctic states, Permanent 
Participants of the Arctic Council, Arctic Council Observer states, and AC Chairmanship 
programs & ministerial declarations.3  
Altogether 56 policy documents as the primary references – national policies/strategies, 
chairmanship programs, and declarations covering the years 1998-2019 – were coded and analyzed. 
This large number of different source materials of Arctic policy documents have not been analyzed 
before. Relevant variables were selected as indicators (and sub-indicators), with altogether 14 
indicators – (re)defining & (re)mapping, human dimension, governance, international cooperation 
& treaties, environmental protection, pollution, climate change (these three together also consisted 
of a super-indicator), security, safety & SAR, economy, tourism, infrastructure, science & 
education, and implementation. The texts of the documents were coded according to the indicators 
(except (re)defining & (re)mapping and implementation) as a quantitative method. Each policy 
document was analyzed (using applied system analysis), compared and searched for similarities & 
differences (striking, relevant, fragmentation), and priorities based on explicit, as a qualitative 
method. Then policies with priorities in each category were compared and discussed with each 
other. Finally, based on all this, and combining quantitative and qualitative methods, 
new/emerging trends were identified and briefly discussed in the context of existing Arctic 
narratives, perceptions and discourses. 
Interesting findings of the policy documents 
There are several relevant and interesting findings of these policy documents which I briefly 
summarize here according to the five categories of the study: Arctic states, Indigenous peoples’ 
organizations, Arctic Council (AC) Observer states, and AC chairmanship programs and 
ministerial declarations.  
The most-quoted indicators of the Arctic states’ policies (adopted in 2009-2013) are governance, 
environmental protection including pollution and climate change, economy, international 
cooperation, and the human dimension. This is more or less according to the official priorities of 
these states’ policies: economy/economic development, environmental protection, international 
cooperation, security/stability. The fact that governance and international Arctic cooperation, as 
well as international treaties (for example for maritime safety), are emphasized by all can be 
interpreted to mean political support for current geopolitical stability and Arctic Council work. At 
the same time, security per se is fragmented, as ‘hard security’ is emphasized by Canada, Iceland 
and USA, and ‘comprehensive security’ by Canada and Finland. 
Economic activities and trade are explicitly emphasized, although fields are fragmented, and 
transportation & shipping, mining and tourism as priorities are striking. The private sector is 
explicitly mentioned by all, while the government and public sector are depicted as the most 
important. The human dimension is referenced with a good number of quotes, though not among 
official priorities. A striking similarity is that climate change is defined as the major research driver, 
when pollution is rarely mentioned. Although research is emphasized, education is neglected and 
mostly framed as attainment for economic reasons. Implementation is explicitly mentioned and 
planned by all, except Canada.  
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Finally, the term ‘Arctic’ is used in all policy-documents (also ‘North’, ‘circumpolar’), though there 
is fragmentation in describing the region (e.g. strategic, fragile, vulnerable, unique, remote), and a 
global perspective is explicitly mentioned in half of them. 
The policy documents of Arctic Indigenous peoples’ organizations, as Permanent Participants 
of the Arctic Council, are fragmented, as they come from different directions and do not 
necessarily cover all the indicator fields in full detail. Arctic Athabaskan Council’s Arctic Policy (2017) 
sets out nine principles of partnership of a new Shared Arctic Leadership Model to provide advice 
on new ambitious sustainable conservation goals for the Arctic, and social and economic priorities 
of Indigenous peoples living in remote Arctic communities. The policy priorities of Inuit Arctic 
Policy (2010), supported by the Inuit Circumpolar Council 2018 Declaration, are health & well-
being of the Inuit (especially children), environmental protection, governance of their homeland, 
Inuit Nunaat i.e. the rights of Inuit to their self-government, and being active in international 
cooperation and supported by international agreements & organizations (UN, AC). Those of the 
Sami Arctic Strategy (2019) are to act as a robust and reliable partner in policy- and decision-making 
on Arctic issues, to ensure the right to choose, to address climate change and environmental 
protection, and to deploy Sami Indigenous knowledge and science.  
There is a striking similarity that all policy documents explicitly address issues broadly surrounding 
Indigenous – individual and collective – rights, although in different contexts, both as a part of the 
human dimension, and also related to governance, both broadly and in detail. The importance of 
the international cooperation (and treaties) is much highlighted for Indigenous rights and self-
governing. Unsurprisingly, all the documents emphasize the rights of Arctic Indigenous peoples 
to use and utilize the resources of their homelands, as well as the importance of ‘traditional 
knowledge’. Unlike, the indicators of environmental protection, pollution and climate change are 
not explicitly covered by all documents; instead the Sami Strategy has critical comments on green 
colonialism. Scientific findings are seen to be produced and developed further in partnership, as the 
Gwich’in report states.  
All in all, there is an impression that these are nations, who are proud, conscious, and know what 
they want and how to accomplish that. 
Among the Observer states of the Arctic Council, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, 
PRC (China), ROK (South Korea), Spain and UK had all adopted (in 2013-2018) an Arctic 
policy/strategy by summer 2019. As the European Union, though it has adopted a couple of Arctic 
policies, is not a permanent observer, it was excluded in the analysis. 
The most-quoted indicators are science & education, environmental protection including pollution 
and climate change, international cooperation & treaties, and economy, more or less according to 
the official priorities/policy goals of these states’ policies. Science & education, including research 
infrastructure (stations & vessels), formal networks (IASC, UArctic) and knowledge-creation (e.g. 
the Italian Tavolo Artico group), is emphasized by Netherlands, ROK and Spain; environmental 
protection, including pollution and climate change, by France, Germany, Italy, PRC and UK; 
international cooperation by all, except Netherlands, in particular by Germany, Japan; and 
economy by France, PRC, ROK and UK (e.g. France’s Roadmap includes economic opportunities 
for French companies). Correspondingly, the human dimension, security, including sovereignty 
and defense, and tourism are among the least-quoted issues. 
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Finally, an interesting finding of the nine policy documents, which are more current than those of 
the Arctic States, is that they also use the term ‘Arctic’ indicating a wish to become Arctic 
‘stakeholders’. There is fragmentation to either include self-identification toward the Arctic, as 
France, PRC, UK do, or exclude it.  
Concerning the Arctic Council chairmanship programs (in 1996-2019) a relevant finding is that 
the official priorities in the programs are focusing on the environment, climate, and the Arctic 
Council main functions, environmental protection and sustainable development. Correspondingly, 
based on the coding the programs’ focus are on governance, international cooperation and the 
human dimension (e.g. health, culture). A bit surprisingly, there are no formal or public evaluation 
processes explicitly mentioned.  
When it comes to the declarations of the Arctic Council ministerial meetings, they do not 
include explicit priority statements, and therefore can be analyzed based on section headings. In 
general, the prioritized issues are around the main functions of the Council, environmental 
protection and sustainable development. These include biodiversity and balance between 
environmental protection and economic activities, as the scientific community is heard in climate 
action. Also health, governance & international cooperation are explicitly mentioned. 
As a summary according to the coding of the 56 policy documents, the overall lists of priorities of 
the three main categories of stakeholders are the following: 
Arctic states: governance, environmental protection included pollution and climate change, 
economy, international cooperation, human dimension; 
Indigenous peoples’ organizations: Indigenous rights, reflecting human dimension and governance, 
international cooperation, right to use resources, traditional/Indigenous knowledge; 
Observer States: science & education, international cooperation, environmental protection included 
pollution and climate change, economy. 
New and emerging trends 
Based on the analysis of these policy documents and their priorities it was possible to identify, 
formulate and analyze what might be new and emerging trends of Arctic governance and 
geopolitics in each category (five lists of trends), as well as what might be new overall trends (see, 
Heininen et al., 2019: 249-253). It is necessary to note here that the task was what are new and/or 
emerging trends implicitly or explicitly included the existing policies and strategies, not current and 
existing trends. For example, the high geopolitical stability of the Arctic is not included, as it is no 
new trend but the current state of the region (e.g. Heininen, 2018) and explicitly mentioned by 
national policies and highlighted in the ministerial declarations (e.g. Rovaniemi, 2019; Fairbanks, 
2017) as the first preamble.  
Based on the five lists of new trends (of all categories) the new and emerging overall trends of 
Arctic governance and geopolitics are the following: 
First, an ambivalence or paradox of Arctic development whenever a balance is been sought 
between environmental protection & climate change mitigation and new economic activities due 
to ‘political inability’; second, state domination supported by geopolitical stability & sovereignty 
vis-à-vis globalization based on international treaties, UNCLOS & maritime law and UN 
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declarations regarding Indigenous rights and self-determination; third, focus on science, as to lean 
on scientific research & international cooperation in science, for problem-solving due to the 
pressure of the rapidly advanced climate change and the above-mentioned paradox; and fourth, 
new interrelationship between the Arctic and Space (e.g. digital security, meteorology, WMO) due 
to climate change, globalization and the global economy. 
Recently updated policies by Arctic states 
As mentioned earlier, there continues a clear tendency and progressive process by the Arctic states 
and a few non-Arctic states (AC Observers) to update existing Arctic policies/strategies. Among 
the Arctic states, Canada, Russia and Sweden have recently approved/adopted a new policy 
document, which I briefly describe and discuss, without systematic analysis, here in the context of 
the 2019 comprehensive study.  
Canada 
An updated Arctic and Northern Policy Framework was approved and released by the Canadian 
Government in September 2019 (Government of Canada 2019). This document, promised several 
years earlier, was delivered after a few years of cooperative work and consultations (regional and 
interest-based roundtables, and a public submissions process) with the Inuit, First nations, Metis, 
and other Northerners, as well as territorial governments and the governments of Manitoba, 
Quebec, and Newfoundland and Labrador. It is explicitly mentioned, even emphasized, that these 
have “contributed to this framework together” and that the framework “has been co-developed 
for the North, in partnership with the North, to reflect the needs and priorities of the North”.4 
Consequently, the document is said to give a “shared vision of the future where northern and 
Arctic people are thriving, strong and safe… [and] a roadmap to achieve this vision”.    
The 2019 Arctic and Northern Policy Framework was described and analyzed, also critically, in 
the Arctic Yearbook 2019 (Kikkert & Lackenbauer, 2019) soon after the launch. In addition to the 
well-grounded note, I have a few observations. Structurally the Arctic and Northern Policy 
Framework differs from most national Arctic policy documents: The foreword and a shared vision 
“Our vision” are followed by substantial discussion on “Our past”, including impacts of 
colonialism, history of the modern self-determination; “Our present”, including impacts of climate 
change and global warming, existing robust rules, norms and institutions, Canada’s long-standing 
sovereignty over, the global consciousness of and growing global interest towards the Arctic, as 
well as multi-dimensional description of the state of the “strong” people & communities, 
“comprehensive” infrastructure, “strong, sustainable and diversified” economies, science & 
Indigenous knowledge, environmental protection, global context, safety & security & defence, 
Indigenous youth of Canadian Arctic & North); and “Our future”, including reconciliation with 
Indigenous peoples, global leadership, promotion of sustainability, safety and security of the Arctic 
& North. After this long introduction, there are the goals and objectives of Canada’s Arctic & 
Northern policy, as well as next steps as conclusions.  
The goals and objectives consist of, on the one hand, the long list of goals (8) from human health 
and security of Indigenous people and sustainable economies to knowledge-guided decision-
making, resilient northern ecosystems and a rules-based international order (also Kikkert & 
Lackenbauer, 2019), and on the other hand, each goal has a list of objectives (from 4-6 to 12). In 
addition, in the beginning of the document there is another long list of matters - nurture healthy 
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families & communities; invest in energy, transport and communications infrastructure; create 
jobs, foster innovation and grow arctic economies, support science, knowledge and research; face 
the effects of climate change and support healthy ecosystems; ensure that Canada and our northern 
residents are safe; restore Canada’s place as an international Arctic leader; and advance 
reconciliation and improve relations between Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples – which are 
mentioned to be “clear priorities and action sets out by the federal government and its partners”.  
It is a bit unclear first how these two long lists of eight matters – “clear priorities” and “goals” – 
relate to each other, then after a more careful study it is possible to find out that the eight points 
(of the both lists) match with each other, though the wording and order differ. More importantly, 
it is neither clear which are real priorities, nor it is explicitly mentioned or discussed how to 
implement those objectives, only promised that “[t]he next phase of framework co-development 
will focus on implementation, invest strategies and governance”.      
Following from this, when comparing the 2019 priorities/goals to the four priority areas of the 
2009 Canada’s Arctic policy there are a few clear differences: first, human dimension, in particular 
“reconciliation with Indigenous peoples”, is more in focus in the 2019 framework document than 
that of 2009; second, unlike, the 2009 document focuses more on environmental protection and 
climate change; third, the 2019 policy document focuses less on sovereignty than the previous one, 
albeit states to ensure the safety, security and defence of northern and Arctic residents, and 
emphasize the importance of rules based on international order in the Arctic.  
In summary: comparing to the overall priorities of the Arctic States’ policy documents, based on 
the coding of the 2019 comprehensive study and analysis, Canada’s updated policy is more or less 
in line with them. It emphasizes more human dimension, in particular health and safety, and 
Indigenous peoples, and less international cooperation and economy. Following from this, it is 
logical that concerning the new trends state domination is not emphasized, but rather human 
health, Indigenous rights and reconciliation. However, the ambivalence implicitly influences the 
updated policy, as there are no clear priorities on environmental protection vis-à-vis economic 
activities.     
Russian Federation  
An updated “Basics of the State policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic for the Period till 
2035” was approved by the Decree of the President (No. 164) in March 2020. This is the third 
policy document with the same kind of structure in the series of the Russian Arctic state policies 
since 2008. The document (based on an unofficial translation) is rather short and reduced, and 
mostly consists of several lists of matters (interests, goals, directions, tasks, objectives, challenges, 
implementation mechanisms and indicators).  
The document consists of several lists. The first one is a list of following Russia’s national interests 
in the Arctic: ensuring sovereignty and territorial integrity; protecting peace, stability and mutual 
partnership in the Arctic; attainment of high quality of life; developing the Russian Arctic zone as 
a strategic resource base; developing the NSR as a competitive national transport & 
communication; and environmental protection and protection of traditional lifestyle of Indigenous 
peoples. That is followed by a list of the Russian state’s policy goals in the Arctic: better quality of 
life of the Russian Arctic population; acceleration of economic development; environmental 
protection; implementation of (mutually beneficial) international Arctic cooperation; and 
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protection of the Russian national interests (in the Arctic). Among the issues of the both lists are 
high quality of life and well-being of the Russian Arctic population, environmental protection 
parallel to (economic) development (of the Russian Arctic zone) and that of the NSR, sovereignty 
and territorial integrity of Russia, and peace and (mutually beneficial) cooperation in the Arctic. 
After these, there are lists of (main) development tasks covering social issues, infrastructure, 
science & technology, international cooperation, protection of the population, ensuring public 
security, that of military security, and border defense. Finally, implementation mechanisms and key 
(performance) indicators for the implementations are described with details, though without 
budget figures. 
As the first observation, there are no explicit priorities mentioned, instead on the one hand, 
national interests of the Federation in the Arctic, and on the other hand, the goals of the state 
policy of Russia in the Arctic (see above). When trying to identify common factors of the interests 
and the goals, it is possible to interpret the following priorities of Russia in the Arctic: high (better) 
quality of life of the Russian Arctic population, including Indigenous peoples; acceleration of 
(economic) development of the Russian Arctic zone, including the Northern Sea Route (NSR); 
environmental protection of the Arctic; peace, stability and (mutually beneficial) Arctic 
cooperation; and protection of Russia’s national interests, sovereignty and territorial integrity in 
the Arctic.  
Another observation is that based on the lists of “development tasks” safety and security are high 
on the agenda, which can be interpreted to refer to the comprehensive security concept. Unlike, 
the 2008 and 2013 state policies were more focused on economy and infrastructure.  
In summary: comparing to the overall priorities of the Arctic States’ policy documents, based on 
the coding of the 2019 comprehensive study, Russia’s updated policy is mostly in line with them, 
though it emphasizes more safety & security, and less economy and infrastructure. Concerning the 
new trends of Arctic governance, the updated policy supports state domination based on 
geopolitical stability and sovereignty, unlike focus on science is emphasized. 
Sweden 
An updated strategy for the Arctic region, “Strategi för den arktiska regionen” was approved by 
the Swedish Government in September 2020 (Regeringens skrivelse 2020/21:7). 
In the updated strategy, the Swedish Government recognizes six theme areas – international 
cooperation in the Arctic, security and stability, climate and the environment, polar research and 
environmental protection, sustainable economic development as swedish business interest, and 
security of good living conditions – as priorities.  
Comparing to Sweden’s first Arctic Strategy (2011) there is a striking difference that, though both 
documents have long lists of objectives and promises what Sweden/the Government will aim or 
do, the 2011 policy was minimalist with three priorities, and the 2020 one is with doubled number. 
From the priorities, international cooperation, security and stability, and polar research are new 
ones, though international cooperation and research (science) were among the most quoted 
indicators of the 2011 policy. Using a qualitative method a striking similarity is that the human 
dimension is much highlighted by the two policies.  
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Concerning the updated policy there are a few observations: First, Indigenous peoples’ culture and 
reindeer herding is been discussed as part of good living conditions, and interestingly, knowledge 
exchange (among Indigenous peoples) is one of the highlighted aspects. Second, among 
international, institutional networks, in addition of the obligatory Arctic Council, Barents Region, 
Nordic cooperation and the EU, the Saami cooperation and cooperation with Germany (bilateral 
cooperation) are explicitly discussed. Third, security & stability, including a separate section of 
strong national defense skills, is explicitly discussed and (re)defined as a new priority. Here China 
is emphasized as the most important factor of the increasing interest by non-Arctic states trend, 
the two other security-political trends are the increased interests towards Arctic resources, and a 
new military dynamics in the Arctic. Fourth, Arctic (or polar) research is explicitly discussed, and 
thus tied, with environmental protection, which is logical. Biodiversity is highlighted, as well as 
nuclear safety, as a continuity Sweden’s environmental politics and scientific community’s interests.  
Finally, if the 2011 policy document thoroughly described that there are “many ties linking Sweden 
to the Arctic”, the 2020 one takes that as granted, as a natural fact.  
In summary: comparing to the overall priorities of the Arctic States’ policy documents, based on 
the coding of the 2019 comprehensive analysis, Sweden’s updated policy is mostly in line with 
them, though security and defense is more emphasized, as well as biodiversity. Concerning the 
new trends of Arctic governance, the updated policy supports focus on science, tries to seek a 
better balance between environmental protection and economic activities, and explicitly mentions 
the Arctic and Space (satellites). 
Updated and new policies by non-Arctic states 
Among non-Arctic states, which have recently approved/adopted an updated policy document on 
the Arctic, are France and Germany, as Arctic Council Observer states. And Scotland has adopted 
its first Arctic policy. I will describe and discuss these three policy documents. In addition, I will 
briefly discuss the 2016 Arctic policy of the EU, though the Union has no permanent observer 
status of the AC, but is an important Arctic stakeholder and seeking to update its Arctic policy.  
France 
A policy document “France and the New Strategic Challenges in the Arctic” was approved in 
autumn 2019. This is neither a real policy document nor updated version of France’s (first) Arctic 
policy, “The National Roadmap for the Arctic” (approved in 2016). This is more a brochure kind 
of publication to refresh the French vision on the Arctic region/Arctic matters, in particular from 
a strategical point of view, released by the Ministry for the Armed Forces.  
The French brochure emphasizes the growing geostrategic importance of the Arctic for example, 
by stating that “it may one day become an area of confrontation”. Followed from this, France’s 
activities and the action of the French Ministry for the Armed Forces (with details and in figures) 
is logical in the region. Though, the 2016 National Roadmap emphasizes economy and France’s 
economic interests in the region, as the highest priority, it also includes a chapter on defense and 
security issues with several recommendations, and sovereignty is explicitly mentioned. Behind is 
“Enhancing legitimacy of France in Arctic affairs” as one of the four main areas. In addition, the 
2016 policy is also a strong statement on behalf of the EU and its legitimate involvement present 
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in the Arctic (Heininen et al., 2019: 194-200) Unlike, the 2019 brochure briefly mentions France 
contributions to an inclusive Arctic governance and French non-military activities in the region. 
In summary: as the main focus of France’s short 2019 document is defense and security issues, 
not comprehensively national interests, there is no sense to compare it to the overall priorities of 
the AC Observer states’ policy documents. 
Germany 
An updated “Germany’s Arctic Policy Guidelines: Assuming Responsibility, Creating Trust, 
Shaping the Future” was adopted in August 2019 (The Federal Government 2019). 
According to the Federal Government, there are seven influential factors and fields for Germany 
in the Arctic: consistent climate and environmental protection, as the Arctic is a “kind of early 
warning system for global warming”; international cooperation, in particular in the Arctic Council 
context and the UNCLOS legal framework; security policy dimension aiming “to preserve the 
Arctic as a largely conflict free region” despite increasing “non-cooperative behaviour in view of 
overlapping interests” worldwide; cutting-edge research (promoting knowledge and resilience as a 
“prerequisite for sustainable development in the Arctic”), where Germany “with a strong profile 
in polar research… is an international actor in the High North”, including the Arctic Ocean; 
safeguarding sustainable development, in particular in resource exploitation for example, “seeking 
to work together with the Arctic states on balanced and sustainable solutions for safe shipping” 
and making Arctic tourism sustainable; and involving the local and Indigenous population among 
others by respecting and recognizing the Indigenous peoples’ “right to freedom and self-
determination”, and welcoming them in the Arctic Council’s decision making “as an equal party”. 
According to the policy document “The future of the Arctic deserves our full attention”, due to 
its vulnerability and influences of the global climate, which is said to constitute “grounds for 
assuming responsibility and taking action”. Among others, Germany is committed “to integrating 
the Arctic into a diversified resource security system as well as to safe and environmentally friendly 
shipping”, and aims “to prevent conflicts (of interest) and potential crises in the Arctic”. Applicable 
shipping and transit rights must be protected. Further it is committed “to ensuring that NATO 
and the EU also devote more attention to the Arctic and its significance in terms of security 
policy”, and “rejects any attempt to militarise the Arctic” (The Federal Government. 2019: 41-42). 
As an interesting observation the updated Arctic policy is more focused than the 2013 policy 
document “Guidelines of the Germany Arctic Policy: Assume Responsibility, Seize 
Opportunities” with a list of eleven issues that the federal government seems to be interested in. 
According to the quantitative analysis based on coding the most discussed were International 
cooperation, (maritime) Governance and Economy (Heininen et al, 2019: 201, 206). A striking 
similarity of the two documents is that environmental protection, climate change, and international 
cooperation continues as priorities, if interpreted the factors & fields of the 2019 as priorities. 
Economy is still in a focus, though in the 2019 document it is explicitly discussed under sustainable 
development. Correspondingly, a difference is that security, science and Indigenous peoples are 
defined as new priorities.  
In summary: comparing to the overall priorities of the AC Observer states’ policy documents, 
based on the coding of the 2019 comprehensive analysis, Germany’s updated policy is mostly in 
line with them, though emphasizes more security policy and Indigenous peoples, and less 
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economy. Concerning the new trends of Arctic governance, the updated policy supports focus on 
science, and internationalization of the Arctic, and maybe seeks prefers sustainable development 
pre to economic activities. 
Scotland 
Scotland approved its first Arctic policy, “Arctic Connections. Scotland’s Arctic Policy 
Framework” (Scottish Government 2019), in September 2019. Scotland did this, though it is (still) 
officially a part of UK, and UK updated its policy towards the Arctic, including Scotland, in 2018. 
As both UK’s Arctic interests (Depledge, 2012), and “costs and benefits in publishing a formal 
Arctic strategy” for Scotland (Johnstone, 2012) were discussed at Arctic Yearbook 2012, it is fair 
to describe and discuss Scotland’s formal Arctic policy here. 
The Scottish Government’s plan is to take action under its Arctic policy framework in the 
following areas (ibid: 42-44), which could be interpreted as priority areas: first, “Scotland looks to 
North” based on peoples’ history and cooperation between Scotland and Arctic nations dating 
back centuries. It states that “Our Arctic work provides further momentum to the Scotland is 
Now campaign, which seeks to project Scotland as a progressive and dynamic nation that does not 
hesitate to take the lead on key global challenges” (ibid: 9). Second, “Education, Research and 
Innovation” based on a long tradition of Scottish universities and research centers of “producing 
world-class science on the Arctic”, and aiming “to be even more closely involved in multi-
disciplinary research that addresses Arctic issues”. Third, “Cultural Ties” based on peoples’ history 
and using culture as a powerful vehicle “by building on the strong cultural links between Scotland 
and the Arctic region… [to] strengthen connections between people, empower communities 
through creativity and be leaders in encouraging international dialogue”. Fourth, “Rural 
connections” as “Remoteness is a common feature of the Arctic region and many parts of 
Scotland” (more than 90% rural and 96 inhabited islands) with many challenges from transport to 
digital connectivity and the provision of medical services.  
Fifth, “Climate change, Environment and Clean Energy”, as the Arctic and its melting glaciers 
illustrates the devastating impact of global warming. “Combined with other environmental threats 
– such as pollution, sea level rise and erosion – climate change poses a serious threat to ecosystems 
and biodiversity on a global scale”. An answer could be renewable energy and decarbonisation 
bringing economic benefits, and therefore the Government works with industries on the energy 
sector to “ensure that the benefits of our transition to a net-zero economy are maximized”. Among 
successful renewable energy projects is the world’s largest floating offshore wind array in Scotland. 
Sixth, under the title of “Sustainable Economic Development” the policy document encourages 
to work with Arctic countries and peoples to “devise solutions that are ecologically accountable 
and combine increased prosperity with greater equality” based on the UN Sustainable 
Development Goals. The document states that Scotland signed up the goals as one of the first 
countries. As well as, it states that Scotland is aiming to become “as a leading space nation… 
building more small satellites than any other place in Europe”, much needed in the Arctic 
experiencing inadequate satellite coverage.  
As the first observation, and the most political notion, the policy document states that 
“Membership of the EU has greatly benefited Scotland’s cooperation with Arctic countries”, and 
therefore, “The UK’s exit from the EU poses a serious risk to Scotland’s domestic and 
international interests, including around Scottish-Arctic relations” (ibid: 6-7). Concerning the 
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politicized relations with the UK interestingly, the 2018 UK policy notes that “although the UK is 
not an Arctic states, we are its nearest neighbor, with Lerwick in the Shetland Islands closed to the 
Arctic Circle than it is to London” (UK, 2018: 2; also Heininen et al., 2019: 233). Actually, the 
Shetland Islands belongs to Scotland as one of its council areas, and consequently, Scotland’s 
Arctic policy also notes that its “northernmost islands are closer to the Arctic Circle than they are 
to London” (Scottish Government, 2019: 5).  
Another observation is that young people in the Highlands and Islands region are interpreted to 
show a “strong sense of belonging and a desire to work in their communities”, which the document 
finds as an idea for a Scottish-Arctic dialogue. Further, the notion of using culture as a powerful 
vehicle in the policy includes an interesting proposal of a Scottish-Arctic Laboratory for cultural 
policies, meaning that Scotland and Arctic countries “can work together to promote equality 
through culture and creativity”. They may even try to find “solutions to remove barriers to taking 
part in cultural life, enabling all citizens to participate and be creative, irrespective of their 
background and personal circumstances”. The historically and culturally close relations between 
Scotland and Iceland are explicitly discussed by mentioning the Wellbeing Economy Governments 
group with the two governments as founding members, which “seeks to apply the principles of 
economic wellbeing to practical and scalable policy approaches”.  
Finally, based on this geographical fact and Scotland’s close links to the Arctic, historically, 
culturally and otherwise, the Scottish Government “intends to strengthen the foundations of a 
long-standing two-way discussion with its Arctic partners… [and] to share Scottish expertise while 
underlining our desire to learn from others” by building a new platform for policy and knowledge 
exchange.  
In summary: all in all Scotland’s Arctic policy is substantial and political, and shows a strong 
interest towards engagement with the Arctic states, as also emphasized by First Minister Sturgeon 
at Arctic Circle Assemblies. Interestingly, it both highlights immaterial aspects (e.g. culture) and 
includes several concrete examples (e.g. Scottish-Arctic dialogue). Comparing to the overall 
priorities of the AC Observer states’ policy documents, based on the coding of the 2019 analysis, 
Scotland’s policy is mostly in line with them. Scotland however emphasizes more clearly culture 
and sustainable economies, and brings in rural connections and remoteness as common features 
of the world’s northernmost regions. The policy also includes self-identification toward the Arctic 
region, as the UK also does. Concerning the new trends of Arctic governance, the Scottish policy 
supports a focus on science, tries to seek a better balance between environmental protection and 
economic activities, and explicitly mentions the Arctic and Space (satellites). 
European Union (EU) 
As the first EU policy (Communication) on the Arctic stated that the European Union “is 
inextricably connected to the Arctic region” (EU, 2008), there was “a perceived need for 
strengthening the Union’s position and presence in the High North, and the EU aims to become 
a real Arctic player” (Heininen, 2011: 65). Followed from this, A Global Strategy for the EU’s 
Foreign and Security Policy (EU, 2016a: 38-39) states, as a part of the priority on cooperative 
regional orders, that “the EU has a strategic interest in the Arctic remaining a low-tension area”. 
This is echoed by the statement of the latest EU’s 2016 Arctic policy that the Union “has a strategic 
interest in playing a key role in the Arctic” (EU, 2016b). In summer 2020, the EU was seeking to 
update its Arctic policy and asked inputs in that from the members states and their decision-
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makers. In October 2020, the EU Commission announced that a new policy was decided to aim 
for 2021. 
According to the 2016 integrated Arctic policy “the EU should engage with the region” on three 
priority areas: climate change and safeguarding the Arctic environment, promoting sustainable 
development in the Arctic, and supporting international cooperation on Arctic issues. These are 
in line with the 2008 policy’s priorities (protecting and preserving the Arctic environment and its 
population; promoting sustainable use of resources; and contributing to enhanced Arctic 
multilateral governance). This shows on the one hand, a continuity of the EU policy in the Arctic 
region and Arctic affairs, and on the other hand, leans on the EU’s reputation of having “always 
prided itself on its soft power – and it will keep doing so” (Mogherini in the EU 2016 Global 
Strategy). 
As an interesting observation, unlike the 2008 policy’s notion of an inextricable connection to the 
Arctic, the 2016 policy recognizes the Arctic states’ contributions “to foster peace and stability 
through cooperation and the application of the rule of law”, echoed by the EU Global Strategy to 
have “a strategic interest in the Arctic remaining a low-tension area” (EU, 2016a). Behind this are 
a few geopolitical facts: three EU member states (Denmark, Finland, Sweden) and two European 
Economic Area members (Iceland, Norway) are among the Arctic states, and Greenland, a part of 
the Kingdom of Denmark, has the status of the Overseas Countries Territories associated to the 
Union. Following from this, there is a paradox and obviously a weak point for the EU’s self-
esteem, that the Union does not have, yet, the status of a (permanent) observership of the Arctic 
Council. 
Another observation is that the Union contributes to the goal of strengthening its soft power by 
enhancing “work on climate action and environmental research, sustainable development, 
telecommunications, and search & rescue, as well as concrete cooperation with Arctic states, 
institutions, Indigenous peoples and local communities” (EU, 2016b). In political rhetoric, this 
statement could be interpreted to represent EU’s new moral language and geopolitical discourse 
on Arctic governance. Finally and importantly, in addition to the (above-mentioned) geopolitical 
facts, and despite the existing Arctic policies and the non-Observer status at Arctic Council, the 
European Union much affects the Arctic region being a global actor in international climate 
negotiations, one of the biggest funders of Arctic research, and the biggest market area for Arctic 
fisheries, among others (Bailes & Heininen, 2012: 84-97; also Airoldi, 2008).  
In summary: if the text of the 2016 EU Joint Communication would be coded according to the 12 
indicators (excluding (re)Mapping/(re)Defining, and implementation) of the 2019 analysis, the 
most quoted ones would be economy, climate change, and science & education. Thus, comparing 
to the overall priorities of the AC Observer States’ policy documents, based on the coding of the 
2019 analysis, the EU policy is more or less in line with them. Concerning the new trends of Arctic 
governance, the 2016 EU policy supports focus on science, and could be interpreted to challenge 
the “Ambivalence of Arctic development” trend by seeking a better balance between 
environmental protection and economic activities, at least in political rhetoric.  
Conclusions  
As critical comments to conclude the overview of the 2019 comprehensive study & analysis is that 
the most-quoted indicators accord more or less with the official priorities/policy goals of the 
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states’ and Indigenous peoples organizations’ policies. Climate change, as a threat multiplier, is the 
driver, a uniting and merging factor, as well as the main reason for focus on science, as one of the 
overall trends of Arctic governance and geopolitics. At the same time, there is ambivalence or 
paradox in Arctic development, as another trend, due to the rapidly advanced climate change (in 
the region). There are also relevant interrelations between the new overall trends and major 
narratives, such as ambivalence vis-à-vis race for resources/state domination vis-à-vis geopolitical 
stability & state controlled development/focus on science vis-à-vis climate ethics/Arctic & Space 
vis-à-vis ‘Global Arctic’. 
From the updated policies of the Arctic states, Canada is more or less in line with the overall 
priorities of the Arctic States’ policy documents (based on the coding of the 2019 comprehensive 
study & analysis), though it emphasizes more human dimension, in particular health and safety, 
and Indigenous peoples, and less international cooperation and economy. Russia is also mostly in 
line with them, though it emphasizes more safety & security, and less economy and infrastructure. 
As well as Sweden is mostly in line with them, though security and defense is more emphasized, 
as well as biodiversity. From the updated policies of non-Arctic states, Germany is mostly in line 
with them, though emphasizes more security policy and Indigenous peoples, and less economy. 
Scotland’s first policy is mostly in line with them, though emphasizes more clearly culture and 
sustainable economies, and brings in rural connections and remoteness as common northern 
features. Finally, the 2016 EU policy is more or less in line with the overall priorities of non-Arctic 
states, though the Union consists of three Arctic states. 
In spite of the focus on science, and explicitly discussed synergy between scientific and Indigenous 
knowledge to tackle climate change, as well as (long) lists of priorities, goals and objectives, states’ 
policies on the Arctic reflect hesitation, when facing and trying to solve grand environmental 
challenges and the wicked problem (combination of rapid climate change, pollution and declining 
biodiversity). They reveal the existing ‘political inability’ to act – to act now. In maintaining the 
achieved constructive cooperation and high geopolitical stability, which are, so far, surprisingly 
resilient, would support the tackling against climate change and pollution in the Arctic region, if 
only that would be put as the most important priority. This kind of a ‘best practice’ would be 
mutually and globally beneficial, and could be a foundation for ‘political ability’ to make a paradigm 
shift in mind-set in world politics, as a precondition for problem solving globally.  
 
Notes 
1. These represent first focus of existing social sciences literature on the Arctic, and another 
focus is covered by multidisciplinary studies on the globalized Arctic as a part of global 
dynamics in the environmental, societal, political and economic spheres. 
2. The project was co-funded by IIASA and Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, and 
supported by Arctic Circle and INAR at University of Helsinki. 
3. The expectation was to understand how perceptions of the Arctic have changed; how 
different actors behave, and define, address, prioritize issues around relevant factors; 
identify the common/shared interests, and dynamics of the interplay, of stakeholders, and 
how their behaving impacts the Arctic region and the entire globe; and finally, based on 
that determine policy consistency, identify new/emerging trends, and discuss them with 
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narratives and perceptions of Arctic governance & geopolitics. In the background was the 
social relevance of science, and the importance to implement the interplay between science, 
politics and business. 
4. Unfortunately, the online version does not have page numbers. 
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